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Abstract 
What are the lessons from the DDA from a forward looking point of view? A decade of 
negotiations is likely to go nowhere. This paper argues that absence of a landing-zone was in the 
data. Quantitative tools modelling the detail of the modalities predicted failure but were not 
taken seriously: the design of the negotiation implied that any achievements of the Round could 
only be limited. Such feebleness was induced by the way multilateral negotiations were 
organized – in separate groups, without much consideration for, or understanding of, how the 
different elements added up to more than the sum of the parts.  We put sensible figures on that 
argument by using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the world economy, 
addressing exceptions, flexibilities as well as the non-linear design of the liberalization formulas, 
a reduction in domestic support, the phasing out of export subsidies in agriculture, as well as 
trade facilitation. Our conclusion is that negotiators have to go back to simplicity and re-bundle 
the topics if they wish to revamp multilateral negotiations.      
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
A decade of multilateral trade negotiations has gone nowhere. What do we learn from this 
failure? We know from recent analyses of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) that the very 
design of the negotiations, combining complex modalities, extensive exemptions, attempts to 
rebalance concessions through sectoral initiatives and efforts to decouple deals, led to failure 
(Wolfe, 2015; Laborde and Martin, 2015).  In this article we put precise figures on the dilemma 
of finding ways of conducting negotiations to reach a deal that delivers gains big enough to 
make the negotiation worth the induced political cost of concessions. We show that the 
absence of a landing zone is clearly revealed by careful modelling of the likely impacts of the 
potential deals that were being considered. Results of such quantitative modelling exercises 
were not taken seriously, even though they provided early warning signals to the negotiators.  
We argue that the same is true for the late stage effort in early 2011 pushed by the US 
administration and partially endorsed by the European Commission to introduce sectoral 
liberalization initiatives in the final package. Emerging economies were reluctant to sign up to 
such initiatives because they could have had sizeable impacts on some of the sectors 
concerned.  
On 29 March 2011, the Director General of the WTO declared that “[it was] time (…), to reflect 
on the consequences of failure” stating that “The absence of progress in NAMA sectorals 
constitutes today a major obstacle to progress on to the remaining market access issues”. By 
June 2011, it was clear that completion of a comprehensive agreement on all the DDA topics 
was impossible by the end of that year. The 8th WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2011, 
welcoming the accession of Russia (as well as Samoa and Montenegro), did not have an “in-
depth debate about the DDA” according to the then Director General, Pascal Lamy. In 2013 his 
successor, Roberto Azevedo, managed to convince WTO Members to reach a deal on a limited 
number of issues at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali (December 2013), including on 
trade facilitation. But hopes for a revitalized negotiating effort to conclude the DDA were again 
dashed in the course of 2014.  
The world economy has changed dramatically since the launch of the DDA in 2001. A number 
of emerging economies have become major players. The 2008 global financial crisis and its 
aftermath implied a major shock to the global economy and has lowered growth prospects in 
                                                             
1 This is a major revision of a paper circulated under the title: Economic Impact of Potential 
Outcome of the DDA. We thank Bernard Hoekman, Alan Winters, a referee and participants in 
the conference “The Multilateral Trading System in the 21st Century”, Washington 18-19 April 
2013, for inspiring comments on the earlier version. 
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some regions. The significant changes in the geopolitical context raise many questions 
concerning the fundamentals of the WTO which are unlikely to be addressed in the 12-month 
period negotiators agreed on in Bali (Aggarwal and Evenett, 2013; Bureau and Jean, 2013).  
One of the big obstacles to a deal is that negotiators have been constrained by a too small 
negotiating set (Evenett, 2014).  If the conclusion is that the landing zone is indeed too small, 
then the implication is new issues need to be added. Alternatively, the problem may be more of 
an artefact of the way negotiations were organized (and analysed) – meaning separately for 
agriculture, NAMA, services and trade facilitation. Negotiating in separate groups, without 
much understanding of how the different elements added up to more than the sum of the 
parts, has been an incentive for introducing several exceptions and sensitive issues making it 
difficult to ultimately deliver. Rebundling the topics would be justified by a new pattern of the 
world economy: the fragmentation of production (Baldwin, 2011; Hoekman, 2014a). Given the 
increasing importance of Global Value Chains – a new reality of the world economy tightly 
linking developed, emerging and developing economies in goods and services trade – there is 
shared interest of exporters and importers in securing market access and facilitating trade, 
which reinforces the need to make progress on the fronts of trade facilitation and services.2 
The empirical relevance of this nexus is illustrated by the (non)-proliferation of protectionist 
measures after the trade collapse of 2008-9. This is not only due to WTO disciplines, but 
reflects the interdependence of countries within global chains, which reduced incentives to use 
protectionism in response to the crisis (see Gawande et al., 2014).3 
Our argument is that beyond the lack of political commitment to conclude the round, tactical 
errors, or the deleterious climate created by the global crisis after 2008, most of the difficulties 
of the DDA were intrinsic to the design of the negotiations. While effort was devoted initially to 
designing general liberalization formulae, exceptions to shield products and sectors and 
countries from the domestic political economy consequences of the resulting systematic cuts 
in protection ignored consideration of the overall gains of concluding the Round (Laborde and 
Martin, 2015). General formulas gave rise to demands for exceptions, including country-
specific provisions to reflect the inability of the WTO membership of addressing the issue of 
graduation from developing country status. Some countries demanded additional flexibilities; 
(very) recently acceded members negotiated differential treatment as they had already 
                                                             
2 Karmakar (2013) acknowledges the importance of negotiating with GVCs in mind, but suggests 
to close the Round as soon as possible in to order to launch a specific Round on that issue. 
3 Using trade and protection data for a series of large emerging countries, Gawande et al. (2014) 
show that participation in global value chains was a powerful economic factor determining 
countries’ trade policy responses to the trade collapse. 
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committed to phase out a significant part of their protection; the least developed countries 
(LDCs) were exempted from tariff reductions, and provisions were also included for small and 
vulnerable economies and countries with low levels of tariff binding. As general (MFN) tariff 
reductions are a source of preference erosion, specific solutions were sought for the affected 
countries, which in turn might well harm countries that did not benefit from preferential 
access. All in all, any text combining all these elements would not only be very complex for 
many countries, it would not lead to an improvement in market access significant enough to 
justify the negotiation effort.  
Bagwell and Staiger (2011) argue there is a “latecomer problem”: given initial starting points 
in terms of levels of protection and the fact that the principle of SDT applies to all developing 
countries, they suggest there is no way of reaching a balanced deal on trade in goods only. 
Within the narrow negotiating agenda on goods trade, negotiators from major developed 
countries raised requests for deeper tariff reduction (on a voluntary basis) and other “zero 
tariff initiatives” in the last stages of the negotiations before they broke down once again. The 
purpose was to restore more “reciprocity” in the concessions. But such “rebalancing” would 
have imposed a sharp redistribution in the gains and concessions among the players: there 
was ultimately no landing zone for the negotiations without considering a broader agenda 
including services and trade facilitation.  
This view is shared by many commenters and experts. Our contribution here is to put numbers 
on the impasse and discuss implications for the way forward. We conduct an exercise to 
quantify the economic impact of a deal. We integrate the most recent proposals circulated in 
the DDA and calculate the possible gains to be reaped.  Our results regarding the magnitude of 
the global gains associated with a successful round is even more pessimistic than the previous 
literature assessing the economic impact of a successful Doha round.4  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the quantifying assumptions. 
Overall results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
2. SOURCES AND QUANTIFYING ASSUMPTIONS  
The intricate nature of the proposals discussed by WTO negotiators in the past decade, which 
include numerous exceptions to a series of rules applied at product level, imposes a specific 
                                                             
4 Francois et al. (2005) obtain a 5% to 11% increase in world trade and a 0.3% to 0.5% increase 
in world GDP.  Bouët and Laborde (2010-b) estimate hypothetical outcomes of the Doha Round. 
In their most ambitious scenario, world output grows by 0.4%. 
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modelling strategy. The state of the art in the applied trade literature is measurement of 
border protection for goods at the most detailed level possible (product, importer, exporter), 
and computation of liberalisation resulting from a tariff-cutting formula. Bound and applied 
duties (whether ad valorem, specific, mixed or compound) need to be measured at the HS-6 
product level (the most disaggregated level for which harmonised information is available). In 
contrast, detailed information on trade facilitation is sparse and one must rely on cruder 
estimates. This is also the case for the other potential big chunk of the gains to be expected, 
namely trade in services. In the latter case, information on the exact impact of regulatory 
measures is much less disaggregated than for goods, and strong assumptions must be made to 
extract quantified measures from the existing qualitative evidence on regulations. We examine 
the impact of the scenarios by taking into account interactions between sectors, countries and 
markets, which is done with MIRAGE (Decreux and Valin, 2007), a dynamic CGE model of the 
world economy that allows for imperfect competition.5 It is only when all these elements of 
complexity are jointly taken into account that the reasons of the failure can convincingly be 
assessed. 
Negotiating design for goods and services   
The creativity demonstrated by negotiators to find a politically acceptable deal was very 
impressive, but it resulted in adding layers of complexity to the negotiations and greatly 
reduced the transparency of the process. A very simple modality, such as use of a non-linear 
tariff cut formula applied to every tariff line as opposed to negotiating product by product, is a 
very convenient design to start with. If properly calibrated, such a measure can have a 
significant effect in lowering tariff peaks and, accordingly, greatly reduce induced distortions. 
It simplifies negotiation over reciprocal concessions among the large number of participating 
countries. However, exceptions necessarily arise due to internal resistance among negotiating 
countries.6 Minimum or maximum average cuts are then added to the liberalisation scheme. 
Less strict treatment was proposed for small and vulnerable economies; membership of a 
customs union implied specific treatments for some members as well as a number of 
exceptions. Specific issues, such a tropical products or tariff escalation, were addressed by 
modifications to the general pattern of modalities. Flexibilities followed some rules to ensure 
that some tariffs would be reduced in all HS chapters. All these issues are taken into 
                                                             
5 MIRAGE relied in this exercise on GTAP-8 data for 2004. The 2004 picture of the world 
protection takes account assumes implementation of the EU-Korea free trade agreement. 
6 The designation of exceptions had to follow certain rules (e.g. non-concentration clauses). 
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consideration in the analysis that follows, which seeks to accurately characterize the 
complexity of the negotiating set that led to the deadlock.  
Sectoral initiatives concerning chemicals, machinery and electronic products deserve special 
attention, as this negotiating device was used in an effort to rebalance concessions in a simple 
way.  These are considered in two of our scenarios.7 For services, three problems have to be 
tackled. First, negotiators devoted limited effort to that area, so that little was known 
regarding the possible contours of a successful deal. Thus, we are obliged to rely on partial 
information and to assume what could be the ultimate achievements. Second, we do not have 
for services the kind of information that we can rely on for barriers to trade in goods. Services 
trade is impeded by regulatory obstacles for which tariff equivalents must be computed as a 
first step. We use here estimates by Fontagné et al. (2011). Third, there is a big question 
regarding the proper modelling of the effects of regulatory barriers, especially whether they 
are rent-creating or cost-enhancing. In communication and transport, we assume regulatory 
barriers allow selected companies to increase their profit margins to their own benefit. This is 
modelled as an export tax, thus mostly benefiting the exporting country. In other services, 
barriers are assumed to be cost-increasing, and are modelled as implying an additional iceberg 
trade cost. In other words, the barriers imply a need for additional inputs of all types 
(intermediate consumption and factors) to deliver the service to its final user. 
Modelling of the modalities 
The reference situation over the whole period is defined by the trajectory of the world 
economy up to 2013 forecast by the International Monetary Fund. From 2013 onwards we use 
the forecast by CEPII based on a three-factor (labour, capital, energy) growth model (Fouré et 
al., 2010). In this model, total population and labour force are from the usual sources 
(International Labour Organization and United Nations), human capital formation is forecast 
on the basis of a catching up process, investment relies on savings, savings are derived from a 
life cycle assumption, and total factor productivity (TFP) and energy efficiency are also 
forecast. Population and GDP are imposed on MIRAGE for every country or region and TFP 
adjusts endogenously at country level in the pre-experiment, with no difference between 
sectors. We perform simulations of various shocks using these TFP changes as exogenous 
variables. The oil (and primary resources) price is endogenous in the model and 2004 
resources are kept constant. This implies that the oil price is multiplied by 2.2 compared to 
world GDP price for 2004-2025 in the reference scenario. 
                                                             
7 Laborde (2011) also tackled the sectoral initiatives, using a slightly different definition. 
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For the NAMA negotiations as well as those on agriculture, we model yearly tariff cuts at the 
product (HS6) and country levels, before aggregation into the regional and sectoral 
decompositions of the model (see the on-line Appendix for details on aggregations used). This 
takes account of the difference between bound and applied tariffs. In addition, we model the 
reduction in internal support for agricultural products and the phasing out of export subsidies.  
We also introduce trade facilitation in the analysis, modelling this as a reduction in time at the 
frontier (customs procedures and time at the port). Transportation time to/from the port can 
vary widely due to the different country sizes, but no improvement is assumed for this trade 
cost. Our trade facilitation experiment consists of dividing by two the processing time 
exceeding the median level, for each category of trade costs (customs and port).8 Only 
members of the WTO engage in the process. We assume that trade facilitation can be achieved 
at no cost, although countries may incur some costs to implement it, for example, the need to 
purchase modern equipment to process goods at the ports and to cope with customs 
procedures.9 These costs are not incorporated in the model because of the absence of data. 
However, the gains implied by a rather moderate scenario are quite significant and, thus, likely 
to outweigh any costs within a short period of time.10 Since industrialised countries also 
benefit from trade facilitation, they committed to assist developing countries implement trade 
facilitation reforms through the “aid for trade” scheme, which will alleviate the cost of 
improving trade facilitation. 
As mentioned, trade in services is another important topic for multilateral trade negotiations 
in particular in light of the presence of Global Value Chains. We adopt here a realistic and very 
cautious assumption on what can be reaped in this area. We assume a 3% reduction in 
protection, limited to all industrialised, most Latin American countries, and Asia except Central 
Asia. Greater ambition on this front could help ease negotiations on other topics.11 
                                                             
8 As performance may vary considerably across regions, we group countries by continents to 
compute this median and chose the closest median, world or continent, in order to avoid 
simulating unrealistic improvements in Europe or Asia. 
9 Trade facilitation can also generate a cost by diverting qualified people from other productive 
sectors. 
10 See Hoekman (2014b) for a review of research on this question and a discussion of the Bali 
Trade Facilitation Agreement. 
11 Most of the action might take place in terms of binding, which has a value per se though not 
captured by the usual modelling strategies. See Gootiiz and Mattoo (2009) for more details on 
services in the DDA. 
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We finally take care of describing precisely the intricate series of flexibilities cushioning the 
impact of the formulas. We introduce flexibilities for special and sensitive products; we exempt 
the LDCs from tariff reductions; consolidate the unbound tariffs; take account of all additional 
elements contained in the most recent Draft Modalities; and address the specific role of 
sectoral initiatives (see the on-line Appendix for detailed descriptions of the analysis).  
The scenarios 
Five scenarios are implemented to characterize the complexity of the negotiating set. These 
scenarios are defined in terms of product categories and initiatives. There are two product 
categories: agricultural and non-agricultural. Services are treated separately. Agricultural (raw 
agricultural and food) products correspond to 677 HS6 products in the HS classification of 
1996 used in the tariff database MAcMap. Fisheries are part of NAMA.12  
Table 1 summarises the different shocks introduced in the exercise. In all scenarios (unless 
otherwise specified), phasing out is linearly applied over a 5 year period for developed 
countries (10 years for developing countries). Recently acceded members were to be granted 
longer periods; we make the simplifying assumption of 12 years. The tariff cut concerns all 
developed countries (including Korea) and the following developing countries: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, Mexico, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. LDCs were not asked to reduce their tariffs; they were only 
to increase the binding coverage. They also benefit from the duty-free, quota-free preferential 
access initiative according to which at least 97% of their tariff lines will be able to enter 
developed countries without tariffs or quotas. Note that this initiative has no impact in the EU 
case, as the Everything but Arms initiative already ensures LDCs duty free access. 
 
                                                             
12 Japan, Switzerland, Tunisia and Turkey apply a slightly different list. 
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Table 1: Description of the scenarios 
    
Agriculture  
+NAMA Services 
Trade 
facilitation 
Chemicals, 
electronics & 
machinery 
Environmental 
goods 
S1 Goods x 
    S2 Goods & serv. x x 
   S3 Benchmark x x x 
  S4 Sectoral x x x x 
 S5 Environment x x x x x 
 
The first scenario concerns the effects of the modalities for agriculture and NAMA. The three 
pillars for agriculture are introduced, while NAMA uses coefficients for the Swiss formula (see 
the on-line Appendix for details). The next two scenarios assess what re-bundling the 
multilateral negotiations could mean by adding services and trade facilitation. The second 
scenario adds a 3% reduction in the equivalent tariff of protection on trade in services. The 
third scenario includes the effects of trade facilitation, modelled along the lines noted above. 
We address only customs efficiency improvements, which give rise to only limited 
implementation costs (Hoekman, 2014b).  The final two scenarios add sectorals to the mix and 
illustrate how efforts to rebalance a potential deal in this way is counter-productive. The 
fourth scenario focuses on sectoral initiatives for chemicals, electronic products and 
machinery. The last scenario adds to this an initiative on environmental goods. 13  
3. RESULTS 
From the current period until 2025, each scenario is implemented with a yearly step, following 
the liberalisation schedule. Results below are presented as deviations from the baseline for each 
scenario. 
Too much complexity, too little gain 
Table 2 shows the overall impact of our benchmark scenario. The long run effect of the 
envisaged trade liberalisation in goods (only) amounts to a limited 0.09% of world GDP 
                                                             
13 We use the WTO list of environmental products. See Committee on Trade and Environment 
Special Session, 21 April 2011.  
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annually (US$ 70 bn in 2025).14 There is an overall increase in world exports of goods of 
1.25%, or US$ 230 bn annually. The reason for such limited gains has been repeatedly 
documented in the literature: introducing flexibilities reduces the overall impact of any deal 
(Jean et al., 2010). As previous GATT Rounds led to much lower mean tariffs for goods, the 
focus of tariff negotiations is now largely on remaining tariff peaks. The rather aggressive non-
linear formula that was adopted in the DDA clashed with the political economy of the domestic 
acceptability of a deal.  
Table 2: Increases per year in world GDP and exports in long run relative to baseline 
 S1 S2 S3 
  Agric + NAMA + Services 
+ Trade 
Facilitation 
Exports % 1.25 1.44 1.95 
Exports USD bn 230 264 359 
GDP % 0.09 0.11 0.20 
GDP USD bn 70 85 152 
 
Note: Long run is 2025. Gains are in constant (2004) dollars, relative to 2025 economic 
values.    
Source: Author’s calculation using MIRAGE 
 
The implication of this first set of aggregate results has not been taken seriously by the 
negotiators: that the kind of negotiation in which they embarked was too complex to deliver 
substantial gains. Not measured here is the fact that a successful Round of multilateral 
negotiations would  dampen the risks of a resurgence of protectionism, either within the strict 
boundaries of WTO rules (e.g. an increase in tariffs up to their bounds), at the fringes of it 
(generalising contingent protection), or outside of it (unilateral increases in protection). Such 
resurgence would have a cost corresponding to a multiple of the gains considered here (Bouët 
and Laborde, 2010-a). Similarly, Hoekman, Martin and Mattoo (2010) insist on the greater 
security for market access that would be provided by a succesful Round and dismiss the idea of 
a dramatic trade liberalization associated with the completion of the DDA. 
                                                             
14 In this paper, “long run” implies year 2025 even though dynamic welfare/GDP gains will 
continue for longer, leading to slightly larger actual long term gains (see Figure 1). Percentage 
deviations are translated into US$ on the basis of current year value (for GDP, exports, etc.) at 
constant 2004 prices. Hence, the long-run gain in US$ is the annual deviation from the baseline 
in 2025, at constant prices. 
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Given the very conservative assumption of a 3% liberalisation of trade in certain services, 
limited to certain importers, the services scenario adds only US$ 15 bn gains in world GDP. In 
trade terms, changes are more important: we obtain an additional US$ 34 bn world trade. The 
impacts of greater ambition can be assessed, as a first approximation (neglecting general 
equilibrium effects), by simple extrapolation.15 
The benefits of re-bundling the negotiation elements are evident when we add the gains from 
trade facilitation. In that case, we can expect a further US$ 68 bn annual increase in world GDP 
from 2025 onwards. A large part of the additional gains would accrue to developing economies 
where the scope for improved performance in terms of custom efficiency and trade costs are 
the highest.  This is consistent with econometric assessments of the potential impacts of a 
reduction in trade costs (e.g., Hoekman and Nicita, 2010). 
Table 3 presents these long term GDP gains at regional or country level.16  In dollar terms, 
China, the EU and Japan17 reap respectively 23%, 17% and 15% of world gains from a goods 
scenario. US gains are smaller (8% of the world total) compared to its relative size in the world 
economy. Three regions suffer small losses: the Caribbean, Mexico and the Sub-Saharan 
countries due to erosion of preferences.18  
These gains are small relative to the size of the countries, raising the question whether the 
potential gains justify the effort needed to obtain any deal of that kind. Indeed, even modest 
progress on the services front changes the outcome for some of the major players. The EU and 
the US would increase gains by 57% and 21%, respectively. Canada and Korea would also 
benefit significantly. 
Lastly, re-bundling trade in goods and services with trade facilitation should ease the 
negotiations.  Trade facilitation results in a shift for Sub-Saharan Africa from a limited loss 
(goods only) to a sizeable US$ 6.4bn GDP gain. Brazilian GDP gains (compared to goods only) 
are multiplied by 5.6, Chinese gains by 2.3, Indian gains by 1.8.  Though developed countries 
would also reap benefits from trade facilitation (e.g., Korea, EU and US), there are no clearly 
identifiable concessions by key trading partners that could be used to increase support for the 
                                                             
15 Recall that effects, for limited changes in variables, are linear. 
16 Introducing port efficiency on the top of our modelling of trade facilitation would not change 
the results qualitatively, but would add another US$ 34bn to world GDP. Results are not 
presented here for sake of simplicity. All countries would gain, China and the EU the most. 
17 Detailed analysis reveals a very significant increase in Japanese car production.  
18 However, as noted below, in two of these regions (Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa – SSA) 
adding trade facilitation results in a positive outcome. 
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negotiations. Hence the push for more aggressive tariff cuts through the so-called “sectorals” 
discussed below. 
 
Table 3: Long run deviation from the baseline, GDP, USDbn 
 S1 S2 S3 
 
Goods + Services + Trade Facilitation 
Argentina 6.9 7.3 8.9 
ASEAN 64.9 73.2 129.7 
Australia & New Zealand 14.0 15.5 17.1 
Brazil 3.7 4.6 20.4 
Canada 8.6 12.0 13.0 
Caribbean -7.2 -7.0 1.3 
China 159.8 184.4 364.7 
European Free Trade Association 72.9 76.7 76.7 
European Union 118.5 185.7 307.3 
India 38.2 43.3 69.3 
Japan 101.9 107.0 137.7 
Korea 6.4 8.9 45.1 
Mexico -4.7 -3.5 -3.0 
North Africa 10.6 11.5 12.8 
Rest of Africa (except South Africa) -5.5 -3.9 60.2 
Rest of Mercosur 4.4 4.8 8.9 
Rest of South America 9.8 10.6 25.3 
Rest of South Asia 4.5 5.8 14.1 
Rest of World 10.0 18.1 73.9 
Taiwan 25.0 26.2 45.2 
USA 53.4 64.5 94.8 
World 696.2 845.5 1523.7 
Note: Long run is 2025. Gains are in constant (2004) dollars, relative to 2025 economic values. 
Source: Author’s calculation using MIRAGE 
 
A comparison of the sectoral and regional results of a scenario combining liberalisation in 
agriculture and manufactures as defined above with services liberalization and trade 
facilitation helps to understand the landing zone constraint (see Table A-4 of the on-line 
Appendix for a scenario consolidating advances on goods and rebalancing with services and 
trade facilitation). In agriculture, the two main beneficiaries of such scenario in terms of 
exports are Australia and New Zealand (+13.7%) and North Africa (+15.8%). Brazil also gains 
in agriculture (+8.7%) but less than China in percentage terms given the initial levels. The 
second largest gains in industrial exports behind Asia (in the range of +3 to +4% for China, 
ASEAN, Korea and Japan) are in the EU and in the US (+3.4% for each region). Industrial 
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exports in Argentina and Canada retrench due to the agricultural specialisation of the two 
countries. Interestingly, North Africa increases strongly its export of services, but from low 
levels. 
In terms of overall agricultural production, Australia and New Zealand benefit the most from 
increased exports because they are more open to international trade (results are reported in 
Table A-5 of the on-line Appendix). Brazil, Argentina and Canada come next. EU production falls 
by 1.2% only. Japan experiences a 4% decrease in agricultural production. Due to their very 
strong initial protection, the EFTA countries face the strongest reduction for agriculture 
production and reorient their resources toward the other sectors (with large efficiency gains 
showing up in overall GDP gains). China and India are hardly affected. 
In the aggregate, all variations in regional level industrial production are below 2% (in 
absolute terms), the main winners being ASEAN, Japan and Korea. Australia, New-Zealand and 
Brazil show value added losses in industry, offsetting gains in agriculture. Canada, the 
Caribbean countries and Mexico are also negatively affected by losing their initially favourable 
access to the US market for industrial goods. Asia is the largest gainer from these changes. The 
US and European industries show a negligible impact on industrial production. 
Production of services is less affected, with variations of less than 1% (in absolute terms) as a 
result of the Round’s limited ambitions for services.  
Rebalancing with sectorals won’t do the job 
Rather than rebalancing of the agriculture and NAMA negotiations by including services and 
trade facilitation, some governments sought instead to add three broad sector-specific tariff 
liberalization agreements on chemicals, machinery, and electronics (these would exclude the 
LDCs). Environmental goods are another area for which sectoral negotiations were proposed 
(and the only one where negotiations are currently ongoing). The data show that such 
attempts to fix the problem of limited and unbalanced gains do not offer a solution to the more 
general problem of a badly designed negotiating agenda. 
To illustrate this, we make the simplifying assumption that such sectoral initiatives are 
endorsed by all developed countries (including Korea) and will include (optimistically) a 
number of developing countries.19 The first three columns of Table 6 report the long run 
                                                             
19 This is not very realistic, but is of course what the demandeurs are seeking. We chose 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, Mexico, China, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. In the WTO, Korea is considered a developed 
country for industrial goods, but not for agricultural goods. 
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change in the volume of trade (in US$bn), associated with the scenarios discussed above. 
Column (1) presents the long run changes in world trade of agricultural and industrial goods 
and services compared to the baseline, associated with a deal for agriculture and the NAMA. 
The US$ 2.6 bn increase in trade in services is a pure general equilibrium effect of this goods-
only agreement. Table 6, column (2) includes limited liberalisation in services. Again, we 
observe small general equilibrium effects on trade in goods. The US$35 billion increase in 
exchange of services is an important achievement that matches additional trade in agricultural 
goods. Table 6, Column (3) illustrates that the impact of trade facilitation is shared among 
agricultural and industrial goods, and general equilibrium effects on trade in services are 
visible again. Agricultural exports increase by another 12% and manufactured exports by 
another 46%. This reveals how customs red tape and additional time costs penalises 
agricultural – and potentially perishable – goods.  
Table 6: Long run change in the volume of trade (bn USD) 
 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
 
Agric+NAMA Services 
Trade 
facilitation 
Mach-
Chem-
Electn. 
Envt. 
zero 
Agriculture 32.28 32.51 36.70 37.83  37.89  
Industry 194.94 195.95 285.41 430.96  438.40  
Services 2.61 35.23 36.42 36.41  36.29  
Note: S1: agriculture + NAMA; S2: agriculture + NAMA + services; S3: agriculture + NAMA + 
services + trade facilitation; S4: agriculture + NAMA + services + trade facilitation + sectorals 
except environmental goods; S5: agriculture + NAMA + services + trade facilitation + sectorals 
including zero tariffs initiative on environmental goods 
Source: Author’s calculation using MIRAGE 
The last two columns of Table 6 report the long run change in the volume of trade for the two 
sectoral initiatives. They must be compared with Column 3. Table 6 Column 4 reports a US$ 
145.6bn increase in trade in industrial goods from including the first set of sectoral initiatives 
(chemicals, machinery, electronics). The general equilibrium effects on agriculture remain 
visible, although small, and there is no effect on trade in services. In Column 5, the sectoral 
initiative on environmental goods is added to the three others. Its impact on trade is negligible 
overall, as gains are in line with the limited product coverage of this proposal (168 HS6 lines 
compared with 430 for machinery, 440 for electronic products and 910 lines for chemicals). 
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Table 7: Long run change in the volume of imports (percent): selected market and sectors 
  
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
China Chemicals 8.61  8.62  13.41  33.25  33.22  
 
Electronic equipment 1.69  1.68  2.23  5.42  5.38  
 
Machinery 6.55  6.58  8.46  23.83  24.13  
      
India Chemicals 1.94  1.93  5.67  47.65  47.63  
 
Electronic equipment -1.03  -1.09  1.11  2.34  2.30  
 
Machinery 8.30  8.17  11.03  61.91  62.80  
      
Mexico Chemicals 0.14  0.13  0.09  6.69  6.57  
 
Electronic equipment -0.10  -0.10  -0.02  4.07  4.00  
 
Machinery 1.32  1.30  1.24  15.01  15.18  
      
Brazil Chemicals 5.36  5.31  7.03  7.86  7.86  
 
Electronic equipment 1.15  1.11  1.99  2.95  2.93  
 
 Machinery 5.39  5.30  6.70  7.78  7.78  
Source: Author’s calculation using MIRAGE 
 
Clearly plurilateral sectoral deals are appealing from a mercantilist point of view and this 
helps explain why negotiators might be tempted to push such proposals, and may do so again 
in the future. But importantly, the political economy of the sectoral initiatives is not 
favourable: big players like India or China, would be confronted with large surge in imports in 
key sectors if the sectorals were adopted.20 This is illustrated for selected emerging countries 
and sectors in Table 7. China would record a 33% increase in imports of Chemicals by 2025, 
instead of 13% in our central scenario including trade facilitation. The corresponding figures 
are 24% and 8% for Chinese imports of Machinery. The import response is even larger for 
India, with 47% and 62% for Chemicals and Machinery respectively. Hence, sectoral initiatives 
were not (and will not) be able to rebalance the implications of the excessively complex 
negotiating modalities. 
Conclusion 
                                                             
20 Results on the sectoral initiatives translate into changes in GDP by region are reported in the 
on-line Appendix. With the sectoral initiative on chemicals, machinery and electronics and 
environment as a whole, Indian GDP gains are largely reduced. Limited losses are also observed 
in Brazil. China, which has offensive interests in certain sectors concerned by the initiatives, 
would gain in terms of GDP overall, but this needs to be put in perspective of the large increase 
in imports in certain sectors. 
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What have we learned from the failure of over a decade of market access negotiations? The 
quantification undertaken here illustrates that very complex modalities of negotiation and ad 
hoc efforts to rebalance a deal may not provide any landing zone for negotiators. The 
combination of various formulae, exceptions and flexibilities for goods, and finally sectoral 
initiatives was too complex and offered too little visibility for negotiators as well as for civil 
society. Limited gains could be expected from the negotiations on trade in goods, the main 
focus of the negotiators and policy makers. All in all, the overall design of the deal finally 
considered was particularly unattractive to certain big players. The ultimate Indian attitude 
towards the negotiation was predictable. The quantitative results of simulation models 
circulated during the DDA negotiations provided clear warnings that were not taken seriously. 
From a forward looking perspective, in our view it is evident that greater simplicity is a 
necessary condition for success. Too much ambition in terms of tariff cuts led to the 
introduction of a series of exceptions and exclusions that greatly reduced potential gains. A 
major underlying reason for this outcome is the inability of the WTO membership to address 
the issue of coverage of special and differential treatment and graduation from developing 
country status. But negotiators also need to do a better job of bundling subjects so as to 
increase the potential gains from a deal for all concerned. 
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